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I. Introduction 
When The Guardian published the initial Snowden 
revelations,1 Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner’s2 reaction was 
immediate. He was the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee 
during the September 11 attacks and had negotiated the Patriot 
Act with the Bush Administration.  
I was the Congressman’s chief of staff. When Mr. 
Sensenbrenner announced his intent to introduce legislation to 
reverse what he saw as National Security Agency (NSA) overreach, 
I was tasked with spearheading his legislative response. These 
efforts led to the USA FREEDOM Act—a bill that would see 
several versions as it navigated the legislative process.3  
While Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) reform and 
passage of the USA FREEDOM Act were ultimately political 
decisions, the Snowden leaks exposed several questions previously 
classified as legal in nature. This Article discusses a few of those 
                                                                                                     
 1. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (last 
visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Biography, CONGRESSMAN JIM SENSENBRENNER, 
http://sensenbrenner.house.gov/biography/ (last visited June 22, 2015)  
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., (Jim), represents the Fifth Congressional 
District of Wisconsin. The Fifth District includes parts of Milwaukee, 
Dodge and Waukesha counties, and all of Washington and Jefferson 
counties . . . . Shortly after the attacks of September 11, Jim introduced 
the PATRIOT Act in the House as a method to help keep America safe 
by enhancing the tools our law enforcement officials could use to 
thwart another terrorist attack. He was proud to watch President Bush 
sign the Act into law. Following revelations of the National Security 
Agency’s bulk collection of data and the misinterpretation of Section 
215 of the Patriot Act, Jim authored the USA FREEDOM Act— 
bipartisan, bicameral, and comprehensive legislation to rein in abuse, 
put an end to bulk collection, increase the transparency of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court and ensure the proper balance between 
national security and privacy is struck.  
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Summary: H.R.3361—USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3361 (last visited June 
22, 2015) (showing an original version) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
BANNING BULK 1309 
questions and attempts to provide a brief overview of reform 
efforts. 
Part II of this Article discusses the standard of production for 
tangible things under § 501 of FISA and the government’s 
overbroad interpretation of that standard. Part III discusses the 
doctrine of judicial ratification in the context of legislation related 
to national security and argues that, in general, it should not 
apply. Part IV discusses legislative responses to the Snowden leaks 
and passage of the USA FREEDOM Act. Finally, Part V evaluates 
how the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection. 
II. Relevance Under Section 215 
First and foremost, the USA FREEDOM Act reformed what 
Congressman Sensenbrenner believed was an overbroad 
interpretation of § 501 of FISA.4  
The first leaked Snowden document was an order from the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) directing Verizon 
to produce, on “an ongoing daily basis,” all call detail records—
primarily who called whom and how long they talked—of every call 
to or from every American, made either to, from, or within the 
United States.5 Subsequent leaks confirmed that similar orders 
were issued to other major carriers.6  
                                                                                                     
 4. See Jim Sensenbrenner, Abuse of the PATRIOT Act Must End, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/ 
09/abuse-patriot-act-must-end (last visited June 22, 2015) (“The administration 
claims authority to sift through details of our private lives because the Patriot Act 
says that it can. I disagree. I authored the Patriot Act, and this is an abuse of that 
law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Secondary Order at 1–2, In re Application of the FBI for an Order 
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., 
No. BR 13-80 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Apr. 25, 2013), 
https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215-Order-to-Verizon.pdf [hereinafter Verizon 
Order]. 
 6. See Dave Kravets, Why AT&T’s Surveillance Report Omits 80 Million 
NSA Targets, WIRED (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/02/ma-bell-non-
transparency/ (last visited June 22, 2015) (“AT&T this week released for the first 
time in the phone company’s 140-year history a rough accounting of how often the 
U.S. government secretly demands records on telephone customers.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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The court granted the order under § 501 of FISA, the so-called 
business records provision.7 Prior to passage of USA FREEDOM, 
§ 501 allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) to obtain 
tangible things when, among other requirements, there were 
“reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought 
[were] relevant to an authorized investigation.”8  
The major legal flaws were two-fold: first, the requirement for 
ongoing production was philosophically at odds with the purpose 
of § 501, in that it was seeking to obtain phone records on an 
ongoing prospective basis; second, the production of all records did 
not square with § 501’s requirement that records be “relevant” to 
an authorized investigation.9 Relevance is not a high legal 
standard, but in crafting § 501, Congress had contemplated a 
targeted authority that the government could use to obtain specific 
data.  
How could everything be relevant? And if everything was 
relevant, what were the practical constraints of § 501?  
There are, of course, instances when the government must—
for investigative purposes—obtain a broader set of documents than 
just those that are ultimately critical to the investigation. In the 
government’s words, “‘[R]elevance’ is a broad standard that 
permits discovery of large volumes of data in circumstances where 
doing so is necessary to identify much smaller amounts of 
information within that data that directly bears on the matter 
being investigated.”10  
                                                                                                     
 7. Verizon Order, supra note 5, at 1. 
 8. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012).  
 9. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE 
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (Jan. 
23, 2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records 
_Program.pdf; Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Criminal 
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/ 
the-criminal-nsa.html (last visited June 22, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 10. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY 
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2 (2013), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJ-NSABulkCollection.pdf [hereinafter 
WHITE PAPER]. 
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While this statement is overbroad,11 it does describe how the 
government may need to collect a certain volume of records for 
investigative purposes. Imagine, for example, that the FBI 
determines an international terrorist purchased fertilizer to build 
a bomb from a farm store in Lexington, Virginia. Because the FBI 
does not know who the suspect is, all fertilizer sales made in 
Lexington, Virginia over a reasonable time period may well be 
relevant to the investigation—at least until the FBI determines 
which sale was actually made to the suspect. 
In this way, the relevance standard can allow for a certain 
amount of bulk in a given collection. After the Snowden leaks, the 
government released a White Paper detailing its legal defense of 
the bulk collection of telephony metadata.12 The government 
contends that, because communications metadata is 
interconnected, and because the connections between data points 
can only be analyzed from a large volume of data, the entire 
dataset is therefore relevant.13 
In other words, for the government, all of our phone calls are 
like the fertilizer sales in Lexington, Virginia. Because the entire 
universe of America’s phone calls undoubtedly contains some calls 
that are relevant to an authorized investigation, and because the 
government does not know which calls are of interest, that entire 
universe of calls is therefore relevant. 
So how is the fertilizer example different from the 
government’s collection of every phone call made by every 
American?  
First, in the fertilizer hypothetical, there are stipulated facts 
that differentiate relevant fertilizer sales records from those that 
are not relevant to the investigation. Section 501 expressly calls 
for this by requiring, not that tangible things sought be relevant to 
an authorized investigation, but that the government produce a 
                                                                                                     
 11. As discussed below, the statement’s underlying logic leads directly to 
bulk collection. If the government can collect large amounts of data when doing 
so is necessary to identify smaller amounts of data, then it can collect any broad 
record set on the assumption that individual pieces will contain information of 
interest.  
 12. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2 (stating metadata collection was 
both statutorily authorized and constitutional). 
 13. Id. 
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“statement of facts showing” that the tangible things sought are 
relevant.14 If this required statement of facts means anything, it 
must require that the statement of facts differentiate the relevant 
materials sought from the universe of all similar records.  
In our hypothetical, the government is not simply requiring 
that every retailer produce all of its sales records. It is bringing 
forward facts that show it has reason to investigate fertilizer sales 
from a particular geographic location. The statement of facts is 
therefore separating the relevant documents from the entire 
universe of similar documents. 
The only alternative would be that the statement of facts 
merely describes why the government needs the records. Under 
this rationale, § 501 would allow the government to collect any and 
all tangible things it deemed useful to an authorized investigation. 
If this was Congress’s intent, it would have said as much.  
With the bulk collection of telephony metadata, the 
government’s statement of facts merely articulates a supposed 
value in collecting data on every call. There are no facts to 
differentiate calls that are more likely to relate to the government’s 
investigation from every other call made by innocent Americans. 
This leads to the second distinction between the fertilizer 
hypothetical and bulk metadata collection—the scope of the 
collection. The government’s interpretation of the section is so 
broad that it ultimately conflates relevance with utility—the 
records are relevant because the government believes it needs 
them. This is not a standard at all.  
Returning to—and distilling—the government’s description of 
relevance: “‘[R]elevance’ is a broad standard that permits discovery 
of large volumes of data . . . where . . . necessary to identify much 
smaller amounts of information . . . .”15 While this describes our 
fertilizer hypothetical, it also allows for any collection, no matter 
                                                                                                     
 14. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012)  
[A] statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized 
investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in accordance 
with subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not 
concerning a United States person or to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities . . . . 
 15. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2. 
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how large, that includes at least some relevant data. The 
government’s interpretation actually creates a perverse incentive 
to over-collect records because a larger volume of data is more 
likely to include relevant material.  
In its White Paper, the government does attempt to articulate 
limits on what it can collect under § 501.16 The government 
contends that the interconnectivity of phone metadata is what 
differentiates it from other types of tangible things.17 Because one 
individual’s phone metadata links to others’ phone metadata, the 
information can be assembled into a singular web. Medical records, 
for example, are discrete, not interlocking, and therefore, an order 
for “all medical records” would not comport with the government’s 
interpretation of § 501.18  
The “interconnectivity” of records, however, does not 
differentiate relevant records from the broader universe of 
records—it simply distinguishes between different types of record 
sets. An awful lot of records would comport with the government’s 
rationale. Emails, texts, sales transactions—who bought what 
from whom—who has visited what doctor and when, and 
essentially any other record that documented any form of social 
interaction could be assembled into a similar “web” and, therefore, 
could meet the government’s definition of relevance. 
Why interconnectivity should confer relevance is ultimately 
unclear—especially given that the government is not actually 
collecting a “web” of data. No such web exists. The phone 
companies never link these records into a web of data to create a 
single tangible thing. The government is simply collecting billions 
of individual records that, by its own admission, it has no legal 
basis to collect. The fact that the government eventually compiles 
all of these records into a database and performs a contact chaining 
process that could identify relevant records does not somehow 
retroactively add relevance to the documents, which of course, 
must be relevant at the time of collection.  
                                                                                                     
 16. See id. at 3 (noting that the Government can only collect information for 
counterterrorism purposes and cannot collect content of call or personal 
information). 
 17. Id. at 14. 
 18. Id. 
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Thus, interconnectivity confers relevance only if you confuse 
utility with relevance. None of this holds up to scrutiny under 
analysis of relevance, and there is little colorable suggestion that 
Congress intended to authorize this program. Neither the 
government nor the FISC seriously suggests otherwise.  
In ACLU v. Clapper,19 the Second Circuit agreed that the 
phone records of every American are not relevant under § 501.20 
The court equated § 501’s standard to a grand jury subpoena.21 
While it acknowledged that the relevance standard used for a 
grand jury subpoena is broad, it is not limitless, and it must be 
tailored to fit a particular investigation.22 The NSA’s bulk 
collection program, by contrast, had no such limits. The court 
wrote, “[T]he records demanded are all-encompassing; the 
government does not even suggest that all of the records sought, or 
even necessarily any of them, are relevant to any specific defined 
inquiry.”23 As a result, the Second Circuit ruled that the 
government’s bulk collection program violated the § 501 relevance 
standard. 
Even though the USA FREEDOM Act amends § 501 to end 
bulk collection, the relevance standard remains in place in both 
§ 501 and in other legal authorities. It therefore remains important 
to confront the government’s overbroad approach.  
To that end, the Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper is 
welcome jurisprudence. In discussing relevance, future courts 
should consider an analytic framework that expressly examines 
(1) whether the government’s theory of relevance differentiates the 
documents needed for its investigation from the broader universe 
of similar records to the greatest extent practicable, and 
(2) whether the government’s theory of relevance is so broad that 
it ultimately conflates relevance and utility. This allows the 
government investigatory leeway without inappropriately opening 
all records to government collection.  
                                                                                                     
 19. 785 F.3d 787 (2015). 
 20. See id. at 812 (“We agree with appellants that such an expansive concept 
of ‘relevance’ is unprecedented and unwarranted.”). 
 21. See id. at 811 (“Both the language of the statue and the legislative history 
support the grand jury analogy.”). 
 22. Id. at 812. 
 23. Id.  
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The government seems to acknowledge that its interpretation 
of relevance is at best strained.24 It therefore attempts to augment 
its interpretation of § 215 by arguing that Congress reauthorized 
the program after the government started its bulk collection 
program. The government writes, “It is significant to the legal 
analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity 
and of the source of its legal authority when the statute was 
reauthorized.”25 As discussed in the next section, this argument is 
also without merit. 
III. Judicial Ratification of Classified Decisions 
The government, the FISC, and at least one federal court have 
argued that, because Congress reauthorized § 501 after the FISC 
approved the bulk metadata collection program under the 
authority, Congress tacitly signaled its intent to enact the 
Administration’s interpretation of the law.26  
The Administration argued, “It is significant to the legal 
analysis of the statute that Congress was on notice of this activity 
and of the source of its legal authority when the state was 
reauthorized.”27 The basic premise is a well-established rule of 
judicial construction—known as ratification—that helps courts 
determine congressional intent by assuming Congress is aware of 
a public understanding of a law or phrase.28 “Congress is presumed 
to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
                                                                                                     
 24. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17. 
 25. Id. at 2. 
 26. See Verizon Order, supra note 5, at 1 (ordering production of telephone 
metadata under 50 U.S.C. § 1861); WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17–18 (“After 
receiving the classified briefing papers, which were expressly designed to inform 
Congress’ deliberations on reauthorization of Section 215, Congress twice 
reauthorized this statutory provision, in 2010 and again in 2011.”); ACLU v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“And viewing all the 
circumstances presented here in the national security context, this Court finds 
that Congress ratified section 215 as interpreted by the Executive Branch and the 
FISC, when it reauthorized FISA.”). 
 27. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2. 
 28. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“The consistent 
gloss represents the public understanding of the term.” (emphasis added)). 
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statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute 
without change.”29  
This assumption is highly problematic when applied to 
legislation relating to national security, however, precisely 
because the judicial and administrative interpretations are not 
public. It is, therefore, much more difficult to know whether 
members of Congress actually know about a relevant 
interpretation of a law. As a result, courts should rarely, if ever, 
find that Congress ratified a classified statutory interpretation.30  
The FISC first authorized the government’s bulk collection of 
telephony metadata under § 501 in 2006.31 In 2010 and 2011, 
Congress reauthorized § 501 without making any changes to the 
text.32 In the interim, the Administration had made its 
interpretation of § 501 available to Congress.33 
On a semiannual basis, the executive branch must provide 
reports to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(House Intelligence Committee or HPSCI), the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (Senate Intelligence Committee or 
SSCI), and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.34 The 
reports must include (1) a summary of significant legal 
interpretations of § 501 involving matters before the FISC, and 
(2) copies of all decisions, orders, and opinions of the FISC that 
include a significant construction or interpretation of § 501.35 The 
congressional reports are classified and are not made public.36  
In addition to providing these classified reports to the 
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, prior to the 2010 
reauthorization, the executive branch made available to Congress 
“a classified, five-page document discussing the bulk telephony 
metadata program.”37 That classified document, which the 
                                                                                                     
 29. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
 30. The fact that classified legal interpretations are themselves problematic 
is outside the scope of this Article. 
 31. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 1. 
 32. Id. at 18. 
 33. Id. at 17–18. 
 34. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 35. 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (2012). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
BANNING BULK 1317 
government recently declassified in part, stated that “Section 501 
orders generally require the production of the business 
records . . . relating to substantially all the telephone calls handled 
by the [telecommunication] companies, including both calls made 
between the United States and a foreign country and calls made 
entirely within the United States.”38  
Senate Intelligence Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein sent a 
letter to colleagues informing them that the Administration had 
made available a classified paper on “intelligence collection made 
possible by authority that is subject to the approaching sunset.”39 
And House Intelligence Chairman Silvestre Reyes sent a letter 
informing his colleagues that “it is important that all Members of 
Congress have access to information about this program.”40 
Because of these disclosures, the government has argued, and 
the FISC and Judge Pauley in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York have accepted, that Congress 
ratified the government’s interpretation of § 501.41 Judge Pauley 
wrote, “[V]iewing all the circumstances presented here in the 
national security context, this Court finds that Congress ratified 
section [501] as interpreted by the Executive Branch and the FISC, 
when it reauthorized FISA.”42 And writing for the FISC, Judge 
Claire Eagan found that “[t]he record before this Court thus 
demonstrates that the factual basis for applying the reenactment 
doctrine and presuming that in 2011 Congress intended to ratify 
Section 501 as applied by this Court is well supported.”43 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 745. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17–19 (“But to the extent there is 
any question as to the program’s compliance with the statute, it is significant 
that, after information concerning the telephony metadata collection program 
carried out under the authority of Section 215 was made available to Members of 
Congress, Congress twice reauthorized Section 215.”); Verizon Order, supra note 
5, at 1 (“This Court having found that the Application of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) for an Order requiring the production of tangible things from 
Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. . . . satisfies the requirements of 50 
U.S.C. § 1861.”); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“[T]his Court finds that Congress ratified section 215 as interpreted by the 
Executive Branch and the FISC, when it reauthorized FISA.”). 
 42. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
 43. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 27, In re Application of the Fed. 
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The concept of ratification fails, however, in highly classified 
settings because it depends entirely on a presumption of 
Congress’s awareness about developments in the law. In a typical 
case, it is reasonable to assume that members of Congress are 
aware of a statutory interpretation prior to passing legislation. 44 
This presumption is simply not reasonable in the national security 
context.  
When information is classified, it is much more difficult for 
members to gain access to it. Reviewing classified material, even 
for a member of Congress, requires arranging time to travel to 
secure facilities to personally review information. A majority of 
members do not employ staff with sufficient clearances to review 
FISC decisions and other interpretations of national security 
authorities. In fact, staff in members’ personal offices in the House 
of Representatives are not permitted to hold sufficiently high 
clearances, so most House members are not capable of employing 
cleared staff.  
In a traditional area of law, there are almost countless ways 
for members to learn of judicial or administrative interpretations. 
There are press reports, email updates, Congressional Research 
Service memos, social media posts, phone calls from constituents 
and lobbyists, briefings from staff, casual conversations, and 
testimony at hearings. The interpretation is public and becomes a 
part of the legislative record and prep materials that members rely 
on. In this context, we know that members are aware of legal 
interpretations because they publicly discuss them. 
The majority of these avenues are simply unavailable in the 
national security context. The result is that fewer members know 
about classified interpretations of statutes. How many fewer is 
impossible to know, and that is the crux of the problem in 
                                                                                                     
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things From, 
No. BR 13-109 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/br13-09-primary-order.pdf. 
 44. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–40 (2009) 
(“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation 
of a statue and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change.”); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (same); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth 
LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“When ‘all (or nearly all) of the’ relevant judicial 
decisions have given a term or concept a consistent judicial gloss, we presume 
Congress intended the term or concept to have that meaning when it incorporated 
it into a later-enacted statute.”). 
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attempting to apply judicial ratification to classified 
interpretations of statutes. The logic underlying ratification—that 
it is reasonable to assume members knew about a judicial 
interpretation—does not apply.  
In the case of § 501, Congress may have been actively misled 
by the Administration. Congressional oversight depends on honest 
testimony. At a hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, 
Senator Ron Wyden asked Director of National Intelligence James 
Clapper, “‘Does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions 
or hundreds of millions of Americans?’ Clapper responded, ‘No, 
sir . . . not wittingly.’”45  
While both the FISC and the district court in Clapper relied in 
part on ratification to uphold the government’s bulk collection 
program, neither court was able to convincingly determine what 
members actually knew. Judge Pauley in Clapper posed the 
question regarding what members of Congress actually knew but 
ultimately concluded that it was enough that “the Executive 
Branch did what it was required to do under the statutory scheme 
that Congress put in place to keep Congress informed about foreign 
intelligence surveillance.”46 But no one accused the government of 
violating its disclosure laws. Judicial ratification is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, not a form of punishment for members of 
Congress perceived to have exercised insufficient due diligence. 
In order for ratification to apply, the question should be: is it 
reasonable to assume that members of Congress were aware of a 
judicial and administrative interpretation and intended to adopt 
that interpretation into law? A finding that ratification does not 
apply in the national security context does not equate to a finding 
of wrongdoing in the executive branch. It is just an 
acknowledgement that the information is more difficult to come 
across and the logic underlying ratification is absent. Courts are 
poorly positioned to determine the extent to which members of 
Congress were aware of, and relied upon, classified information in 
the legislative process. As a result, judicial ratification should 
rarely, if ever, be applied to classified statutory interpretations.  
                                                                                                     
 45. Paul Campos, How James Clapper Will Get Away with Perjury, SALON 
(June 12, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/12/how_james_clapper_will_get_ 
away_with_perjury/ (last visited June 23, 2015) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 46. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 745. 
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In Clapper, the Second Circuit overturned Judge Pauley’s 
ruling and rejected the government’s argument that Congress 
ratified the Administration’s determination. First, the court noted 
that ratification cannot overcome the plain meaning of a statute. 
“Where the law is plain, subsequent reenactment does not 
constitute an adoption of a previous administrative 
construction.”47 
The court further noted that the Supreme Court wrote in 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, “The consistent gloss represents the 
public nature of the statutory interpretation is central to the 
doctrine.”48 The point is to help courts determine congressional 
intent. If a court does not know whether members were aware of a 
classified interpretation, it cannot logically assume that they 
intended to adopt it. In Clapper, the Second Circuit wrote,  
 
But here, far from the ordinarily publicly accessible 
judicial or administrative opinions that the 
presumption contemplates, no FISC opinions 
authorizing the program were made public prior to 
2013—well after the two occasions of 
reauthorization upon which the government relies, 
and despite the fact that the FISC first authorized 
the program in 2006.49 
 
Congress’s response to the Snowden leaks confirms the logic 
underlying the Second Circuit’s decision. Upon learning of the 
government’s interpretation of § 501, members took concrete steps 
to block the changes. The nature of the debate was fundamentally 
different from previous debates to reauthorize the PATRIOT Act. 
Unlike previous reauthorizations, Congress openly discussed 
whether to allow bulk collection.50  
                                                                                                     
 47. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 819 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Demarest v. 
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)). 
 48. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 243 (2011) (“The consistent gloss 
represents the public understanding of the term.” (emphasis added)). 
 49. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 820. 
 50. In a recent blog post, Professor Steven Vladeck touched upon this point: 
[G]iven what we now know about the government’s 
interpretation of section 215, there’d be no way to view such a 
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It ultimately voted not to. Congress’s rejection of bulk 
collection once the practice was public is strong evidence that it did 
not intend to ratify the Administration’s classified interpretation. 
It is a lesson on the hazards of judging Congressional intent based 
on non-public information.  
For the above reasons, courts should closely reexamine 
whether ratification makes sense in the context of national 
security decisions. 
IV. The Procedural History of the USA FREEDOM Act 
The Snowden leaks were public in June 2013.51 Members and 
staff began work on the USA FREEDOM Act soon thereafter.52 In 
July of that same year, Representative Justin Amash from 
Michigan introduced an amendment to the annual defense 
appropriation bill that would have stripped the NSA of funding for 
                                                                                                     
“clean” reauthorization as anything other than congressional 
ratification of that (dubious) reading of the statute—which 
would leave the Fourth Amendment challenge as the only 
remaining issue to be resolved by the Second, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits (and, perhaps, the Supreme Court). In other words, 
the closer we get to June 1 without meaningful discussion in 
Congress about section 215 reform, the more likely it is that 
we’ll get a result that’s worse than no reform–unqualified 
congressional validation of the government’s deeply contested 
interpretation. That’s not reform; that’s entrenchment.  
Steve Vladeck, Whither the Section 215 Reauthorization Debate?, JUST SECURITY 
(Mar. 19, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://justsecurity.org/21263/section-215-
reauthorization-debate/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files-Timeline, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54 PM), www.theguardian. 
com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline (last visited May 10, 
2015) (providing a timeline of the disclosures by Edward Snowden) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 52. See Chris Gentilviso, Justin Amash’s NSA Surveillance Amendment 
Ruled In Order, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013, 11:34 PM), 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/22/justin-amash-nsa-surveillance_n_3637 462. 
html (last updated July 23, 2013, 10:49 AM) (last visited May 10, 2015) (“A little 
more than a month after secret National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance 
programs were leaked to the public, one GOP congressman is making headway 
with his push to defund those initiatives.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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its implementation of § 501.53 Despite heavy lobbying against the 
amendment from House leadership of both parties and from the 
White House, the amendment was narrowly defeated by a vote of 
217 to 205.54  
The Amash amendment was a blunt, rather than a nuanced, 
response to the NSA overreach,55 and it was aggressively opposed 
by both leadership and the White House.56 Its narrow political 
defeat was thus a clear political signal that there was a strong 
desire for reform in the House of Representatives.57  
This signal was augmented when Congressman 
Sensenbrenner introduced the USA FREEDOM Act that fall.58 The 
bill attracted 152 cosponsors,59 as well as the support of technology 
companies and privacy groups.60 Importantly, twelve of the bill’s 
cosponsors had voted against the Amash amendment—more than 
enough to have reversed the outcome of the vote.61 In 2013, in the 
wake of the Snowden leaks, a clear majority of the House of 
Representatives favored reforming surveillance authorities.62 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Austin Wright, Justin Amash Prevails as Amendment Fails, 
POLITICO (July 24, 2013, 7:27 PM), www.politico.com/story/2013/07/justin-amash-
nsa-amendment-94722.html (last updated July 27, 2013, 9:45 AM) (last visited 
May 10, 2015) (discussing the amendment Representative Amash introduced) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. See id. (discussing the Amash amendment). 
 55. See id. (describing the Amash amendment as a “controversial measure”).  
 56. See id. (“The measure drew the ire of House Republican leaders and the 
White House.”). 
 57. See id. (discussing how civil liberties advocates threatened to oppose any 
attempt to quash the amendment).  
 58. Dan Roberts, Congressional Duo Launch NSA Overhaul Bill and Urge 
‘Meaningful Reform,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:51 PM), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/nsa-overhaul-bill-legislation-usa-
freedom-act (last visited May 10, 2015) (writing about the launch of the USA 
FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 59. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) 
(introducing the USA FREEDOM Act).  
 60. See, e.g., Open Letter to the Senate, REFORM GOV’T SURVEILLANCE (May 
19, 2015), www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com/#111614 (last visited Aug. 
20, 2015) (encouraging the Senate to pass the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 61. See USA FREEDOM Act, supra note 59 (listing cosponsors of the USA 
FREEDOM Act). 
 62. See Wright, supra note 53 (discussing how the House of Representatives 
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While the depth of support was less clear in the Senate, Senator 
Patrick Leahy introduced an identical Senate companion bill.63  
From the beginning, the surveillance debate exposed unusual 
Washington allegiances that were more about grassroots versus 
leadership than traditional partisanship.64 Leadership from both 
parties and the White House opposed the bill upon its 
introduction,65 but it was supported by some of the most liberal and 
conservative members of the House and Senate.66  
Passing any legislation is difficult in the current political 
climate, but it is exponentially more difficult when the law in 
question is opposed by leadership.67 Members supporting the bill, 
however, joined by outside privacy groups and tech companies, 
were putting near-constant pressure on Congress for reform.68 In 
February 2014, a group of over forty technology companies and 
privacy groups organized an event titled “The Day We Fight Back” 
in an effort to encourage Congress to vote on the USA FREEDOM 
Act.69 Congressman Sensenbrenner alone published eight op-eds 
                                                                                                     
“overwhelmingly passed a separate NSA amendment . . . [that] would ensure the 
NSA [was] barred from acquiring or storing the content of emails and phone calls 
of people in the United States”). 
 63. See USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) 
(introducing the identical Senate bill).  
 64. See Roberts, supra note 58 (“The measure also has more than 70 
bipartisan co-sponsors in the House and enjoys the diverse support of groups 
ranging from the National Rifle Association to the American Civil Liberties 
Union.”).  
 65. See Wright, supra note 53 (discussing opposition to earlier attempts to 
limit the NSA bulk-collection).  
 66. See Roberts, supra note 58 (listing members of both parties that 
supported the bill).  
 67. See Philip Bump, The 113th Congress Is Historically Good at Not Passing 
Bills, WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2014/07/09/the-113th-congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills 
(last visited May 10, 2015) (discussing Congress’s inability to pass bills) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 68. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (discussing the bipartisan 
support for the USA FREEDOM Act and the pressure from various groups).  
 69. See THE DAY WE FIGHT BACK, thedaywefightback.org (last updated Feb. 
13, 2014) (last visited May 10, 2015) (calling on organizations and individuals to 
take action against mass surveillance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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to help build momentum,70 and there was a slow leak of disclosures 
from the Snowden documents, keeping the need for reform in the 
news.71 
Senator Feinstein, the Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, attempted to recapture the conversation by 
introducing the FISA Improvements Act.72 The bill opened by 
stating its intent to end bulk collection, but then listed numerous 
exceptions that largely allowed the Administration to maintain the 
status quo.73 
Senator Feinstein easily moved the FISA Improvements Act 
through her own committee, but the bill was poorly received 
outside the Intelligence Committee and was widely panned by 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Jim Sensenbrenner, The Abuse of the PATRIOT Act Must End, THE 
GUARDIAN (June 13, 2013, 7:00 PM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/ 
jun/09/abuse-patriot-act-must-end (last visited May 13, 2015) (discussing the 
Congressman’s efforts to take action to curtail abuses of the Patriot Act) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Sensenbrenner & Senator Pat 
Leahy, The Case for NSA Reform, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2013, 9:40 PM), 
www.politico.com/story/2013/10/leahy-sensenbrenner-nsa-reform-98953.html 
(last updated Oct. 29, 2013, 6:42 AM) (last visited May 13, 2015) (calling for 
reform of the NSA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim 
Sensenbrenner, The NSA Overreach Poses a Serious Threat to Our Economy, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013, 8:30 AM), www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/ 
nov/20/jim-sensenbrenner-nsa-over reach-hurts-business (last visited May 13, 
2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim 
Sensenbrenner, NSA Abused Trust, Must Be Reined In, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL 
(Nov. 2, 2013), www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/nsa-abused-trust-must-be-reined-
in-b99131601z1-230292131.html (last visited May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim Sensenbrenner, How Obama Has 
Abused the Patriot Act, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), www.latimes.com/opinion/ op-
ed/la-oe-sensenbrenner-data-patriot-act-obama-20130819-story.html (last visited 
May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jim 
Sensenbrenner, How Secrecy Erodes Democracy, POLITICO (July 22, 2013, 11:12 
PM), www.politico.com/story/2013/07/how-secrecy-erodes-democracy-94568.html 
(last visited May 13, 2015) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 71. See Gidda, supra note 51 (citing to a timeline of the Snowden 
disclosures). 
 72. See FISA Improvements Act, S. 1631, 113th Congress (1st Sess. 2013) 
(introducing the FISA Improvements Act).  
 73. See id. (excepting a variety of bulk collection methods from the bill’s 
scope). 
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editorial boards and outside groups.74 It never received a vote on 
the Senate floor.75  
Adding to the pressure for reform was that the business 
records provision, along with two other surveillance authorities 
from the PATRIOT Act—roving wiretaps and lone wolf—were set 
to sunset on June 1, 2015.76 Increasingly, reform appeared to be 
the only way to save these authorities, and USA FREEDOM 
appeared to be the only acceptable vehicle for reform.77 
Actual movement came when Chairman Mike Rogers of the 
House Intelligence Committee announced his intention to move his 
own FISA reform bill, The FISA Transparency and Modernization 
Act.78 The bill was carefully structured, not only to maintain the 
status quo with regard to current surveillance programs, but to do 
so in a way that avoided triggering jurisdiction in the House 
Judiciary Committee.79  
With its oversight of the judiciary and federal law 
enforcement, the Judiciary Committee was, historically, the 
primary committee of jurisdiction for surveillance authorities.80 
                                                                                                     
 74. See, e.g., Nicole Ozer, Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s NSA ‘Reforms’: Bad for 
Privacy, Bad for Business, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 9, 2013, 2:29 PM), 
www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/sen-dianne-
feinsteins-nsa-reforms-bad-privacy-bad (last visited May 13, 2015) (criticizing the 
FISA Improvements Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 75. See FISA Improvements Act, supra note 72 (failing to go to a vote on the 
Senate floor). 
 76. See, e.g., Nadia Kayyal, Section 215 of the Patriot Act Expires in June. Is 
Congress Ready?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 29, 2015), 
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/section-215-patriot-act-expires-june-congress-
ready (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the planned sunsetting of the roving 
wire taps and lone wolf provision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 77. See id. (mentioning how the USA FREEDOM Act extended the sunset of 
§ 215 by two years). 
 78. See The FISA Transparency and Modernization Act, H.R. 4291, 113th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (“Mr. Rogers . . . introduced the following bill.”). 
 79. See id. (allowing for certain bulk collection programs and providing that 
“[t]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have jurisdiction to review”).  
 80. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Critics Express “Deep Concern” Over Route 
Change for House Reform Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014, 7:35 AM), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/26/nsa-critics-house-reform-bill-switch 
(last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how review through the Intelligence 
Committee and not the Judiciary Committee was “highly unusual”) (on file with 
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The HPSCI bill, therefore, was not only a dramatic substantive 
departure from USA FREEDOM, but also a significant 
jurisdictional shift.81 
While nuanced, the issue of committee jurisdiction is 
significant.82 Different committees and different committee chairs 
often have drastically different perspectives.83 The Judiciary 
Committee is composed primarily of lawyers.84 Their perspective 
is shaped by their legal backgrounds, as well as by their primary 
focus of overseeing federal law enforcement, such as the FBI, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, and the other federal law 
enforcement entities.85 Judiciary Committee members are 
typically well-versed in the Constitution and constitutional rights 
and view the government’s interaction with the public through the 
prism of criminal law and its long history of regard for individual 
rights.86  
The Intelligence Committee, by contrast, has primary 
jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSA.87 
Its perspective is similarly shaped by these relationships,  their 
                                                                                                     
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 81. See id. (discussing the “deep concern” about the jurisdictional shift from 
the House Judiciary Committee to the Intelligence Committee). 
 82. See id. (discussing some of the ramifications of the jurisdictional shift). 
 83. See John R. Wright, Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in 
the U.S. House of Representatives, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417, 430 (1990) (providing 
an example of how the Ways and Means Committee consider themselves more 
senior, generally safer electorally, and concerned with broader and more 
important substantive problems than the Agricultural Committee). 
 84. See About the Committee, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/committee-members (last visited May 30, 2015) 
(“Due to the legal nature of the committee’s work it has been customary for 
members of the committee to have a legal background.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85. See id. (listing the jurisdictional scope of the Judiciary Committee).  
 86. See id. (discussing the legal background and “breadth of knowledge” 
committee members often have, as well as the types of matters that come before 
the committee). 
 87. See History and Jurisdiction, H. INTELLIGENCE COMM. (last visited May 
30, 2015) (discussing the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Committee) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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focus on clandestine activities, and the need to collect 
intelligence.88  
A jurisdictional shift from the Judiciary to the Intelligence 
Committee could, therefore, have had a profound effect on the 
substance of our surveillance laws.89 As a result, the Intelligence 
Committee Chair’s decision to move the FISA Transparency and 
Modernization Act proved to be a critical motivator to convince 
House Judiciary Chairman, Bob Goodlatte, to move the USA 
FREEDOM Act.90 The two committee chairs announced their 
intention to markup competing FISA reform bills on the same 
day.91  
To avoid this conflict within the Republican Conference, then-
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor organized a meeting with 
Chairmen Rogers, Goodlatte, and Sensenbrenner and asked that 
they reconcile the differences between their dramatically different 
bills.92 Because a substantial majority of the House of 
Representatives favored reform, the USA FREEDOM Act became 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. (discussing the oversight of the Intelligence Committee).  
 89. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of 
changing the jurisdiction to the Intelligence Committee from the Judiciary 
Committee). 
 90. See, e.g., Dustin Volz, House to Advance Bill to End Mass NSA 
Surveillance, NAT’L J. (May 5, 2014), www.nationaljournal.com/tech/house-to-
advance-bill-to-end-mass-nsa-surveillance-20140505 (last visited May 30, 2015) 
(discussing how the decision to hold a mark-up of the USA FREEDOM Act may 
have been “a counter to plans the House Intelligence Committee ha[d] to push 
forward a competing bill”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 91. See id. (“[J]ust hours after the Freedom Act earned a markup date, the 
Intelligence Committee announced it, too, would move forward with a markup of 
its own NSA bill—the FISA Transparency and Modernization Act.”). 
 92. See generally Spencer Ackerman, USA Freedom Act Unanimously Clears 
House Judiciary Committee, THE GUARDIAN (May 7, 2014, 5:14 PM), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/07/usa-freedom-act-clears-house-
committee-nsa-surveillance (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the 
Intelligence Committee was also going to mark up the USA FREEDOM Act) (on 
file at Washington and Lee Law Review); Lisa Mascaro, White House’s Late 
Changes to NSA Spying Bill Shake Support, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2014, 7:28 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-nsa-reforms-legislation-20140522-
story.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (discussing how “officials argued in the 
closed discussions” in House Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s office and also 
discussing the changes to the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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the basis for negotiations between the House Judiciary and 
Intelligence Committees.93  
Prior to action, the two committees worked closely with the 
Administration and House leadership to review and negotiate the 
original bill.94 The result was a significant narrowing of the text, 
though it still maintained its core functions of (1) ending bulk 
collection across all surveillance authorities, (2) increasing 
transparency and oversight of surveillance authority, and 
(3) reforming the FISC.95  
The negotiated bill passed the Judiciary Committee 
unanimously on May 7, 2014.96 The Intelligence Committee passed 
the identical text by voice vote.97 
The period between committee and floor consideration led to 
another difficult round of negotiations with the Administration 
and House leadership.98 Much of the difficulty stemmed from 
drafting technicalities, rather than substantive disagreements. On 
the one hand, proponents of reform believed that the government’s 
expansive reading of relevance99 necessitated a narrowly drafted 
ban on bulk collection.100 The Administration, however, argued for 
broader construction because it worried that narrow language 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Ackerman, supra note 92 (discussing the support for the USA 
FREEDOM Act). 
 94. See id. (discussing the new version of the USA FREEDOM Act). 
 95. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) 
(presenting an edited version of the USA FREEDOM Act to the Senate). For a 
more detailed discussion of the USA FREEDOM Act, see infra Part V. 
 96. See Ackerman, supra note 92 (reporting the unanimous passing of the 
USA FREEDOM Act in the Judiciary Committee). 
 97. See Josh Gerstein & Alex Byers, House Intel Surprises on NSA 
Surveillance, POLITICO (May 8, 2014, 2:29 PM), www.politico.com/blogs/under-
the-radar/2014/05/house-intel-surprises-on-nsa-surveillance-188205.html (last 
visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the House Intelligence Committee passed 
the USA Freedom Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. See Julian Hattern & Christina Marcos, House Votes 303-121 to Curb 
NSA, THE HILL (May 22, 2014, 11:08 AM), thehill.com/policy/techynology/206929-
house-votes-to-limit-nsa-spying (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the 
opposition the bill faced) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 99. See supra Part II (discussing the arguments surrounding the “relevance” 
wording). 
 100. Press Release, Rep. Zoe Lofgren., Rep. Zoe Lofgren Floor Statement on 
Opposing the USA FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file with the author). 
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could be misinterpreted by the FISC to limit unintended 
collection.101  
The result was compromise legislation that neither side 
thought perfect.102 Importantly, the bill for the first time received 
the unqualified support of the White House. The White House 
endorsed the bill in an official policy statement that read:  
The bill ensures our intelligence and law enforcement 
professionals have the authorities they need to protect the 
Nation, while further ensuring that individuals’ privacy is 
appropriately protected when these authorities are employed. 
Among other provisions, the bill prohibits bulk collection 
through the use of Section 215, FISA pen registers, and 
National Security Letters.103 
Unfortunately, however, the bill lost the support of many of the 
key privacy groups and technology companies.104 The primary 
objection was that the bill too narrowly defined the limiting term 
used to ban bulk collection.105 Thus, while the USA FREEDOM Act 
easily passed the House of Representatives, it lost the support of 
some of its strongest congressional patrons.106  
                                                                                                     
 101. See David Kravets, NSA Reform Falters as House Passes Gutted USA 
Freedom Act, ARSTECHNICA (May 22, 2014, 1:12 PM), arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2014/05/nsa-reform-falters-as-house-passes-gutted-usa-freedom-act (last 
visited May 30, 2015) (discussing how the Obama administration pressured 
Republicans to water down the USA FREEDOM Act) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 102. See id. (providing views from different representatives about the watered 
down bill). 
 103. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT 
OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2014). 
 104. See Andrea Peterson, NSA Reform Bill Passes House Despite Loss of Civil 
Rights Groups, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), www.washington post.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2014/05/22/nsa-reform-bill-passes-house-despite-loss-of-support-from-
privacy-advocates/ (last visited May 30, 2015) (“But privacy advocates, technology 
companies and lawmakers warned that the version of the bill passed by the House 
was watered down to the point where they could no longer support it.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 105. See id. (discussing how the initial version of the bill included a more 
narrow definition).  
 106. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 230, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 22, 2014), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2014/roll230.xml (last visited August 4, 2015) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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In his statement on the House floor, Congressman 
Sensenbrenner conceded that the compromise legislation fell short 
in some respects, but nonetheless argued for the bill’s support: 
Let me be clear, I wish this bill did more. To my colleagues who 
lament changes, I agree with you. To privacy groups who are 
upset about lost provisions, I share your disappointment. The 
negotiations for this bill were intense, and we had to make 
compromises, but this bill still deserves support. Don’t let the 
perfect be the enemy of the good. Today, we have the 
opportunity to make a powerful statement: Congress does not 
support bulk collection.107 
On May 22, 2014, the House of Representatives passed this version 
of the USA Freedom Act, with 303 votes in favor and 121 
opposed.108 Upon House passage, Senator Leahy put out the 
following statement: 
Today’s action in the House continues the bipartisan effort to 
restore Americans’ civil liberties. But I was disappointed that 
the legislation passed today does not include some of the 
meaningful reforms contained in the original USA FREEDOM 
Act. I will continue to push for these important reforms when 
the Senate Judiciary Committee considers the USA FREEDOM 
Act next month.109 
Because so many privacy advocates and technology companies 
pulled their support for the House-passed version of the USA 
FREEDOM Act, Senator Leahy had the opportunity to reopen 
negotiations with the now-supportive Administration.110 Senator 
                                                                                                     
 107. Press Release, Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Statement on the House 
Floor in Support of H.R. 3361 the USA FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file 
with the author). 
 108. See Hattern & Marcos, supra note 98 (discussing the margin in which 
the House passed the USA FREEDOM Act). 
 109. Press Release, Sen. Pat Leahy, Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy (D-
Vt.), Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, on House Passage of the USA 
FREEDOM Act (May 22, 2014) (on file with the author).  
 110. See Tom Risen, Patrick Leahy Introduces Privacy Boosted USA 
FREEDOM Act, U.S. NEWS (July 29, 2014, 12:07 PM), www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2014/07/29/patrick-leahy-introduces-privacy-boosted-usa-freedom-act 
(last visited May 30, 2015) (“Leahy has been negotiating with the Obama 
administration and other members of the Senate and the intelligence community 
on changes to the legislation since a compromise version of the legislation passed 
the House.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Leahy succeeded in updating the House-passed legislation and 
rebuilding the bill’s original coalition of privacy groups and 
technology companies, while maintaining support from the 
Administration.111 Importantly, General James Clapper and 
Attorney General Eric Holder endorsed the bill, writing:  
The Intelligence Community believes that [the USA FREEDOM 
Act] preserves essential intelligence community capabilities; 
and the Department of Justice and the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence support your bill and believe that it is a 
reasonable compromise that enhances privacy and civil liberties 
and increases transparency.112 
Despite this coalition, the bill ultimately failed to meet the 
sixty-vote threshold for cloture in the Senate.113 The USA 
FREEDOM Act thus died in the 113th Congress, despite support 
from 303 members of the House of Representatives and fifty-eight 
Senators.114  
The Senate vote could have been the end of reform efforts.115 
Because, however, three surveillance provisions from the 
PATRIOT Act would sunset on June 1, 2015, there was a continued 
need to address privacy concerns stemming from government 
surveillance.116 In early 2015, members began bipartisan, 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Kaylyn Groves, Coalitions Support Leahy’s USA FREEDOM Bill for 
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 112. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., and James Clapper, Dir. 
Nat’l Intelligence, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 
2, 2014), http://fas.org/irp/news/2014/09/ag-dni-usaf.pdf. 
 113. See 160 CONG. REC. S6,075–03 (daily ed. Nov. 18. 2014) (roll call for 
Senator Leahy’s USA FREEDOM Act garnering only fifty-eight yeas).  
 114. See supra notes 98, 113 and accompanying text (discussing the House 
and Senate votes on the USA FREEDOM Act). 
 115. See Adi Robertson & Nathan Ingraham, USA Freedom Act for NSA 
Reform Is Voted Down in the Senate, THE VERGE (Nov. 18, 2014, 8:29 PM), 
www.theverge.com/2014/11/18/7241967/usa-freedom-act-for-nsa-reform-is-voted-
down-in-the-senate (last visited May 30, 2015) (“[N]ew legislation around this 
program will still be required despite the Senate’s vote.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 116. See id. (discussing the scheduled sunset of Section 215). 
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bicameral discussions to reconcile the House-passed version of the 
USA FREEDOM Act with the updated version introduced by 
Senator Leahy.117 
On April 28, 2015, Congressmen Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte, 
Conyers, and Nadler reintroduced the USA FREEDOM Act.118 The 
members had first reconciled the differences between the House 
and Senate versions of the bill with Senators Lee and Leahy, then 
with Chairman Devin Nunes, the new Chair of HPSCI, and finally 
with House leadership. Despite strong support in the House, 
Senate leadership had still not indicated support for the bill.  
On May 13, the House of Representatives again passed the 
USA FREEDOM Act. The vote in 2015 was 338 in favor and eighty-
eight opposed.119 The overwhelming support was an important 
statement for the Senate.  
With the sunset for the PATRIOT Act’s surveillance 
authorities on the horizon, the Senate nonetheless dug in against 
the USA FREEDOM Act. Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, along 
with Senate Intelligence Chair Saxby Chambliss and Senate 
Judiciary Chair Chuck Grassley, pushed for a clean 
reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act authorities—an extension of 
the existing authorities without any reforms.120 Meanwhile, 
Senator Rand Paul drew a hard line on the other side and 
advocated for a complete sunset of the authorities.  
These tensions came to a head when Majority Leader 
McConnell brought the USA FREEDOM Act to the Senate floor on 
                                                                                                     
 117. See Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reform Bill Imperiled as It Competes with 
Alternative Effort in the Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2015, 9:03 PM), 
www.theguardian.com/us-news-2015/apr/28/house-nsa-reform-bill-senate-usa-
freedom-act (last visited May 30, 2015) (discussing the 2015 USA FREEDOM Act 
version that was the product of ten weeks of “closed-door” negotiations in 
Congress) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 118. H.R. 2048—USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, CONGRESS.GOV,  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2048/actions (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 119. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 224, OFFICE OF THE CLERK (May 13, 2015), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll224.xml (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 120. Kim Zetter, Senate Fails to End NSA Bulk Spying, Votes Against USA 
FREEDOM Act, WIRED (May 23, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/senate-
fails-end-nsa-bulk-spying-votes-usa-freedom-act/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2015) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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May 22—just over a week before expiration of the PATRIOT Act 
authorities. Heavy lobbying from Senate hawks led to a narrow 
defeat on a procedural vote with fifty-seven Senators voting to 
proceed to debate on the USA FREEDOM Act, three votes short of 
the sixty-vote threshold for cloture.121 
Senator McConnell attempted to pass a two-month 
reauthorization of the expiring authorities. The Senate, however, 
easily defeated his proposal. Senator McConnell then proposed a 
one-week extension, but Senator Paul objected, thereby blocking 
the vote.122 McConnell suggested an extension until June 5, but 
Senator Wyden objected.123 Then McConnell tried for June 3, only 
to have Senator Heinrich object.124 Finally, the Majority Leader 
asked for an extension through June 2, but Senator Paul objected 
to even this twenty-four-hour extension of the expiring 
authorities.125 
Exasperated, Majority Leader McConnell announced that the 
Senate would reconvene from its recess on May 31, just hours 
before expiration of the surveillance authorities. Late that night, 
the Senate voted 77–17 to proceed to consideration of USA 
FREEDOM.126 Senator McConnell filed several amendments 
designed to weaken the civil liberties protections of the bill.127 
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NSA Reform, THE HILL (May 31, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/national-
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(last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Senate rules, however, would not allow a vote on final passage 
of the bill or the amendments until Tuesday, June 2. As a result, 
three surveillance authorities from the USA PATRIOT Act 
temporarily sunset at 12:00 AM on June 1, 2015.  
Any amendments to the House-passed bill would have, at the 
least, delayed reauthorization of the authorities, as the House of 
Representatives would have had to vote on the Senate-amended 
bill. There was also no guarantee that the House would accept the 
Senate’s changes. As a result, Senator McConnell was bucked by 
his own party as the Senate voted down each of his amendments 
by a simple majority vote. The Senate then passed the identical 
language as the House, 67–32, enacting the USA FREEDOM Act 
into law.128 
V. The USA FREEDOM Act’s Ban on Bulk Collection 
The USA FREEDOM Act was always intended to end bulk 
collection, but the way the bill met this goal evolved during the 
legislative process.129  
Upon introduction, the USA FREEDOM Act sought to end 
bulk collection by crafting new standards of collection across 
government surveillance authorities.130 When, however, the House 
Judiciary and Intelligence Committees scheduled the bill for 
markup, the FBI privately worried that the new standard could 
have unintended consequences for individual collection.131 
To address this concern, members settled on a different 
approach whereby the standard for individual collection was left 
intact, but USA FREEDOM added a new requirement that the 
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government include a “specific selection term” as the basis for 
production under (1) § 501, (2) for orders for a pen register trap 
and trace device, and (3) for various national security letter (NSL) 
authorities.132  
Section 501 of FISA 
USA FREEDOM expands the § 501 surveillance authority 
with a specific new mechanism for the collection of call detail 
records.133 The mechanism grew out of a proposal that President 
Obama proposed in January, 2014. The President announced 
reforms to the collection of signals intelligence by the federal 
government and issued Presidential Policy Directive (PPD). For 
collection of business records other than call detail records, the 
USA FREEDOM Act requires the government to use a specific 
selection term as the basis for production.  
In January, 2014 the Administration released Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD 28), which defined bulk collection as the 
acquisition “of large quantities of signals intelligence data which . . 
. is acquired without the use of discriminants (e.g., specific 
identifiers, selection terms, etc.).”134 By requiring a specific 
selection term, the USA FREEDOM Act therefore, by definition, 
ended bulk collection.135 But would this new limitation be 
sufficient in practice?  
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While virtually every line of the Act’s text was subject to 
scrutiny and negotiation, there was no aspect of the bill that 
garnered more intense focus than the definition of specific selection 
term. It was primarily this definition that led many technology 
companies and privacy groups to pull their support for the USA 
FREEDOM Act after it first passed the House in 2014.136 It was 
only after Senator Leahy redrafted the definition that these 
organizations again supported the bill. 
In drafting the statute, it became clear that bulk collection—
at least the bulk collection most members objected to—was less 
about the exact quantity of tangible things sought than the 
indiscriminate nature of the collection.137 As discussed in Part II, 
this was the critical distinction between the government’s 
metadata collection program and our fertilizer hypothetical.138 The 
metadata collection program is considered “bulk,” while the 
fertilizer hypothetical is not because the collection of fertilizer 
sales is no broader than necessary for the purpose of the 
investigation.139 
The relevance standard should have required a statement of 
facts that separated the necessary documents or tangible things 
from the broader universe of similar tangible things, but the 
government interpreted the standard to obviate this analysis and 
ultimately conflate relevance and utility—the government 
believed it should have access to any data that could serve a useful 
investigatory purpose. 
As enacted, the USA FREEDOM Act defines a specific 
selection term as: 
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freedom-act/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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 137. See 160 CONG. REC. H4800 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of Rep. 
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 138. See supra Part II (discussing the distinctions between metadata 
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 139. See 160 CONG. REC. H4793–4801 (daily ed. May 22, 2014) (statement of 
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BANNING BULK 1337 
(i) IN GENERAL - Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a 
‘specific selection term’— 
 (I) is a term that specifically identifies a person, account, 
 address, or personal device, or any other specific 
 identifier; and 
 (II) is used to limit, to the greatest extent reasonably 
 practicable, the scope of tangible things sought consistent 
 with the purpose for seeking the tangible things. 
(ii) LIMITATION.—A specific selection term under clause (i) 
does not include an identifier that does not limit, to the greatest 
extent reasonably practicable, the scope of tangible things 
sought consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible 
things, such as an identifier that— 
 (I) identifies an electronic communication service provider 
 (as that term is defined in section 701) or a provider of 
 remote computing service (as that term is defined in 
 section 2711 of title 18, United States Code), when not 
 used as part of a specific identifier as described in clause 
 (i), unless the provider is itself a subject of an authorized 
 investigation for which the specific selection term is used 
 as the basis for the production; or 
 (II) identifies a broad geographic region, including the 
 United States, a city, a county, a State, a zip code, or an 
 area code, when not used as part of a specific identifier as 
 described in clause (i).140 
The complexity of the definition reflects the intensity of 
negotiations over the term. A lot of the analysis of the definition 
focused on the initial clause and the limitation. The fact that a 
specific selection term cannot be used to identify an “electronic 
service provider” or a “broad geographic area” is an important 
restriction, but the key to the new legal standard is that the 
specific selection term must be “used to limit, to the greatest extent 
reasonably practicable, the volume of tangible things sought 
consistent with the purpose for seeking the tangible things.”141 The 
SST is, therefore, not intended to put a cap on the total amount of 
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records, but instead, to limit the number of records to the greatest 
extent possible.142  
As discussed in Part II, this limitation should have been 
considered an essential aspect of the relevance standard.143 
Because it was not, the USA FREEDOM Act explicitly codified the 
limitation. The standard requires a case-by-case, fact-specific 
determination by the FISC as to whether the government’s request 
is limited to the “greatest extent reasonably practicable.”144 
USA FREEDOM also expands the Section 501 surveillance 
authority with a specific new mechanism for the collection of 
call detail records.145 The mechanism grew out of a policy that 
President Obama proposed in January, 2014. The President 
announced reforms to the collection of signals intelligence by 
the federal government and issued PPD 28.146 He directed that 
the FISC would first approve queries of telephone metadata 
collected by the NSA under Section 501 of FISA and that such 
queries would be limited to two “hops.”147  
USA FREEDOM relies on these reforms and establishes a 
new, narrowly-tailored mechanism for the targeted collection of 
telephone metadata. It is narrower than the bulk program the 
government operated prior to PPD 28, but broader than what 
would otherwise be allowed under § 501 as amended by the USA 
FREEDOM Act.  
If the government can demonstrate a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that a specific selection term148 is associated with a 
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foreign power or an agent of a foreign power engaged in 
international terrorism, the FISC may issue an order for the 
ongoing, daily production of call detail records held by telephone 
companies. The FISC may order the production of up to two 
“hops”—i.e., the call detail records associated with the initial 
telephone number and the records associated with the records 
returned in the initial hop.149  
This new authority—designed to allow the government to 
search telephone metadata for possible connections to 
international terrorism—does not preclude the government’s use 
of standard business records orders under Section 501 to compel 
the production of business records, including call detail records, 
but the collection would not be prospective and the government 
likely could not collect “two hops” from the targeted individual. 
VI. The USA FREEDOM Act’s Ban on Bulk Collection Across 
Other Authorities 
Section 201 of the Act prohibits bulk collection under the pen 
register and trap and trace device authority by requiring that each 
application include a specific selection term as the basis for the use 
of the device. 
The definition of “specific selection term” is similar to the 
definition of that term for § 501 orders. Specifically, it is a term 
that specifically identifies a person, account, address, or personal 
device, or any other specific identifier, that is used to limit, to the 
greatest extent reasonably practicable, the scope of information 
sought, consistent with the purpose for the use of a pen register or 
trap and trace device. It does not include terms that are not so 
limited, such as terms based on a broad geographic region or 
service provider. 
Finally, § 501 of the USA FREEDOM Act prohibits the use of 
various NSL authorities (contained in the Electronic 
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Communications Privacy Act, Right to Financial Privacy Act, and 
Fair Credit Reporting Act) without the use of a specific selection 
term as the basis for the NSL request. It specifies that for each 
NSL authority, the government must specifically identify the 
target or account.  
VII. Conclusion 
Negotiating FISA reform, I sometimes imagined my 
intelligence-minded colleagues looking with bewilderment at those 
of us across the table who were working to end bulk collection. Why 
exactly should we care? 
It is a fair question. It would be a clean line if we believed that 
our records were somehow inviolable—that our records are our 
own and our right to keep them from the government is absolute, 
absent some suspicion of wrongdoing. But virtually all proponents 
of reform concede that this standard would be too restrictive for 
records not protected by the Fourth Amendment.150 The 
government does, in some instances, need to collect “large volumes 
of data” to identify “smaller amounts of information” that bear on 
an investigation.151  
So if the government can collect the records of innocent 
persons for investigative purposes in some circumstances, why can 
it not in others?  
Ultimately, the limits are a check on government power.152 
Just as we are naïve to ignore the very real threats to our national 
security, we would be equally naïve to ignore the very real 
encroachments our government has made on civil liberties at 
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perilous times in our country’s history. Under the government’s 
definition of relevance, the government can indiscriminately 
collect and store data when it believes the datasets are potentially 
valuable.153 Once the FISC accepts this construct, the line becomes 
the government’s to draw. 
Limits on government power matter. Maybe more 
importantly, where those limits are drawn should be a political 
question. If the government is to conduct bulk collection—and the 
courts ultimately deem it constitutional—it should be a democratic 
choice made by elected officials accountable to the voters.  
The USA FREEDOM Act represents a clear political product, 
drafted as an honest attempt to equip the intelligence community 
with the tools it needs without unnecessarily compromising 
privacy or civil liberties. There is no perfect place to draw the line 
between privacy and national security. The Constitution does, 
however, establish that the political process is the perfect way to 
draw it.  
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